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Abstract:   
In this paper we have devised an alternative methodological approach for 
quantifying utility in terms of expected information content of the decision-
maker’s choice set. We have proposed an extension to the concept of utility by 
incorporating extrinsic utility; which we have defined as the utility derived from 
the element of choice afforded to the decision-maker by the availability of an 
object within his or her object set. We have subsequently applied this extended 
utility concept to the case of investor utility derived from a structured, financial 
product – an custom-made investment portfolio incorporating an endogenous 
capital-guarantee through inclusion of cash as a risk-free asset, based on the 
Black-Scholes derivative-pricing formulation.  We have also provided instances 
of potential application of information and coding theory in the realms of financial 
decision-making with such structured portfolios, in terms of transmission of 
product information.  
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Introduction: 
 In early nineteenth century most economists conceptualized utility as a psychic reality – 
cardinally measurable in terms of utils like distance in kilometers or temperature in 
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degrees centigrade. In the later part of nineteenth century Vilfredo Pareto discovered 
that all the important aspects of demand theory could be analyzed ordinally using 
geometric devices, which later came to be known as “indifference curves”. The 
indifference curve approach effectively did away with the notion of a cardinally 
measurable utility and went on to form the methodological cornerstone of modern 
microeconomic theory.  
 
 An indifference curve for a two-commodity model is mathematically defined as the locus 
of all such points in E2 where different combinations of the two commodities give the 
same level of satisfaction to the consumer so as the consumer is indifferent to any 
particular combination. Such indifference curves are always convex to the origin 
because of the operation of the law of substitution. This law states that the scarcer a 
commodity becomes, the greater becomes its relative substitution value so that its 
marginal utility rises relative to the marginal utility of the other commodity that has 
become comparatively plentiful. 
 
 In terms of the indifference curves approach, the problem of utility maximization for an 
individual consumer may be expressed as a constrained non-linear programming 
problem that may be written in its general form for an n-commodity model as follows: 
 
                                                Maximize U = U (C1, C2 … Cn) 
                                                Subject to Σ CjPj ≤ B  
                                                and Cj ≥ 0, for j = 1, 2 … n                                             (1) 
 
 If the above problem is formulated with a strict equality constraint i.e. if the consumer is 
allowed to use up the entire budget on the n commodities, then the utility maximizing 
condition of consumer’s equilibrium is derived as the following first-order condition: 
 
                                             ∂U/∂Cj = (∂U/∂Cj) - λPj = 0 i.e. 
                                            (∂U/∂Cj)/Pj = λ* = constant, for j = 1, 2 … n                      (2) 
 
 This pertains to the classical economic theory that in order to maximize utility, individual 
consumers necessarily must allocate their budget so as to equalize the ratio of marginal 
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utility to price for every commodity under consideration, with this ratio being found equal 
to the optimal value of the Lagrangian multiplier λ*. 
 
 However a rather necessary pre-condition for the above indifference curve approach to 
work is (UC1, UC2 … UCn) > 0 i.e. the marginal utilities derived by the consumer from each 
of the n commodities must be positive. Otherwise of course the problem degenerates. 
To prevent this from happening one needs to strictly adhere to the law of substitution 
under all circumstances. This however, at times, could become an untenable proposition 
if measure of utility is strictly restricted to an intrinsic one. This is because, for the 
required condition to hold, each of the n commodities necessarily must always have a 
positive intrinsic utility for the consumer. However, this would invariably lead to 
anomalous reasoning like the intrinsic utility of a woolen jacket being independent of the 
temperature or the intrinsic utility of an umbrella being independent of rainfall.  
 
 Choice among alternative courses of action consist of trade-offs that confound 
subjective probabilities and marginal utilities and are almost always too coarse to allow 
for a meaningful separation of the two. From the viewpoint of a classical statistical 
decision theory like that of Bayesian inference for example, failure to obtain a correct 
representation of the underlying behavioral basis would be considered a major pitfall in 
the aforementioned analytical framework. 
 
 Choices among alternative courses of action are largely determined by the relative 
degrees of belief an individual attaches to the prevailing uncertainties. Following Vroom 
(Vroom; 1964), the motivational strength Sn of choice cn among N alternative available 
choices from the choice set C = {c1, c2 …cN} may be ranked with respect to the 
multiplicative product of the relative reward r (cn) that the individual attaches to the 
consequences resulting from the choice cn, the likelihood that the choice set under 
consideration will yield a positive intrinsic utility and the respective probabilities p{r (cn)} 
associated with r (cn) such that: 
 
                     Smax = Max n [r (cn) x p (Ur(C) > 0) x p{r (cn)}], n = 1, 2 … N                       (3) 
                                      
 Assuming for the time-being that the individual is calibrated with perfect certainty with 
respect to the intrinsic utility resulting from a choice set such that we have the condition 
p (Ur(C)  > 0) = {0, 1}, the above model can be reduced as follows: 
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                      Smax = Max k [r (ck) x p{r (ck)}], k = 1, 2 … K such that K < N                  (4) 
                                      
 
 Therefore, choice A, which entails a large reward with a low probability of the reward 
being actualized could theoretically yield the same motivational strength as choice B, 
which entails a smaller reward with a higher probability of the reward being actualized.  
 
 However, we recognize the fact that the information conveyed to the decision-maker by 
the outcomes would be quite different for A and B though their values may have the 
same mathematical expectation. Therefore, whereas intrinsic utility could explain the 
ranking with respect to expected value of the outcomes, there really has to be another 
dimension to utility whereby the expected information is considered – that of extrinsic 
utility. So, though there is a very low probability of having an unusually cold day in 
summer, the information conveyed to the likely buyer of a woolen jacket by occurrence 
of such an aberration in the weather pattern would be quite substantial, thereby 
validating a extended substitution law based on an expected information measure of 
utility.  The specific objective of this paper is to formulate a mathematically sound 
theoretical edifice for the formal induction of extrinsic utility into the folds of statistical 
decision theory. 
 
A few essential working definitions 
 Object: Something with respect to which an individual may perform a specific goal-
oriented behavior 
 Object set: The set O of a number of different objects available to an individual at any 
particular point in space and time with respect to achieving a goal where n {O} = K 
Choice: A path towards the sought goal emanating from a particular course of action - 
for a single available object within the individual’s object set, there are two available 
choices - either the individual takes that object or he or she does not take that object. 
Therefore, generalizing for an object set with K alternative objects, there can be 2K 
alternative courses of action for the individual 
Choice set: The set C of all available choices where C = P O, n {C} = 2K 
Outcome: The relative reward resulting from making a particular choice 
 Decision-making is nothing but goal-oriented behavior. According to the celebrated 
theory of reasoned action (Fishbain; 1979), the immediate determinant of human 
behavior is the intention to perform (or not to perform) the behavior. For example, the 
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simplest way to determine whether an individual will invest in Acme Inc. equity shares is 
to ask whether he or she intends to do so. This does not necessarily mean that there will 
always be a perfect relationship between intension and behavior. However, there is no 
denying the fact that people usually tend to act in accordance with their intensions.  
 
 However, though intention may be shaped by a positive intrinsic utility expected to be 
derived from the outcome of a decision, the ability of the individual to actually act 
according to his or her intention also needs to be considered. For example, if an investor 
truly intends to buy a call option on the equity stock of Acme Inc. even then his or her 
intention cannot get translated into behavior if there is no exchange-traded call option 
available on that equity stock.  Thus we may view the additional element of choice as a 
measure of extrinsic utility. Utility is not only to be measured by the intrinsic want-
satisfying capacity of a commodity for an intending individual but also by the 
availability of the particular commodity at that point in space and time to enable 
that individual to act according to his or her intension.  Going back to our woolen 
jacket example, though the intrinsic utility of such a garment in summer is practically 
zero, the extrinsic utility afforded by its mere availability can nevertheless suffice to 
uphold the law of substitution. 
 
Utility and thermodynamics 
 In our present paper we have attempted to extend the classical utility theory applying 
the entropy measure of information (Shannon, 1948), which by itself bears a direct 
constructional analogy to the Boltzmann equation in thermodynamics. There is some 
uniformity in views among economists as well as physicists that a functional 
correspondence exists between the formalisms of economic theory and classical 
thermodynamics. The laws of thermodynamics can be intuitively interpreted in an 
economic context and the correspondences do show that thermodynamic entropy and 
economic utility are related concepts sharing the same formal framework. Utility is said 
to arise from that component of thermodynamic entropy whose change is due to 
irreversible transformations. This is the standard Carnot entropy given by dS = δQ/T 
where S is the entropy measure, Q is the thermal energy of state transformation 
(irreversible) and T is the absolute temperature. In this paper however we will keep to 
the information theoretic definition of entropy rather than the purely thermodynamic one. 
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Underlying premises of our extrinsic utility model 
 
1. Utility derived from making a choice can be distinctly categorized into two forms: 
 
(a) Intrinsic utility (Ur(C)) – the intrinsic, non-quantifiable capacity of the 
potential outcome from a particular choice set to satisfy a particular 
human want under given circumstances; in terms of expected utility 
theory Ur (C) = Σ r (cj) p{r (cj)}, where j = 1, 2 … K and 
 
(b) Extrinsic utility (UX) – the additional possible choices afforded by the mere 
availability of a specific object within the object set of the individual 
 
2. An choice set with n (C) = 1 (i.e. when K = 0) with respect to a particular 
individual corresponds to lowest (zero) extrinsic utility; so UX cannot be negative 
 
3. The law of diminishing marginal utility tends to hold in case of Ux when an 
individual repeatedly keeps making the same choice to the exclusion of other 
available choices within his or her choice set 
 
 Expressing the frequency of alternative choices in terms of the probability of getting an 
outcome rj by making a choice cj, the generalized extrinsic utility function can be framed 
as a modified version of Shannon’s entropy function as follows: 
 
                                   UX = - K Σj p {r (cj)} log2 p {r (cj)}, j = 1, 2 … 2K                                       (5) 
 
 The multiplier -K = -n (O) is a scale factor somewhat analogous to the Boltzmann 
constant in classical thermodynamics with a reversed sign. Therefore general extrinsic 
utility maximization reduces to the following non-linear programming problem: 
 
Maximize UX = - K Σj p {r (cj)} log2 p {r (cj)} 
                                   Subject to Σ p {r (cj)} = 1, 
                                                        p {r (cj)} ≥ 0; and 
                                                        j = 1, 2 … 2K                                                            (6) 
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 Putting the objective function into the usual Lagrangian multiplier form, we get 
 
                                    Z = - K Σ p {r (cj)} log2 p {r (cj)} + λ (Σ p {r (cj)} – 1)                (7) 
 
 Now, as per the first-order condition for maximization, we have 
 
                                    ∂Z/∂ p {r (cj)} = - K (log2 p {r (cj)} + 1) + λ = 0 i.e. 
 
                                     log2 p {r (cj)} = λ/K – 1                                                              (8) 
 
 Therefore; for a pre-defined K; p {r (cj)} is independent of j, i.e. all the probabilities are 
necessarily equalized to the constant value p {r (cj)}*= 2-K at the point of maximum UX. 
 
  It is also intuitively obvious that when p {r (cj)}= 2-K for j = 1, 2, … 2K, the individual has 
the maximum element of choice in terms of the available objects within his or her object 
set. For a choice set with a single available choice, the extrinsic utility function will be 
simply given as UX = – p{r (c)} log2 p{r (c)} – (1 – p{r (c)}) log2 (1 – p{r (c)}). Then the 
slope of the marginal extrinsic utility curve will as usual be given by d2UX/dp{r (c)} 2 < 0, 
and this can additionally serve as an alternative basis for intuitively deriving the 
generalized, downward-sloping demand curve and is thus a valuable theoretical spin-off!  
 
 Therefore, though the mathematical expectation of a reward resulting from two mutually 
exclusive choices may be the same thereby giving them equal rank in terms of the 
intrinsic utility of the expected reward, the expected information content of the outcome 
from the two choices will be quite different given different probabilities of getting the 
relative rewards. The following vector will then give a composite measure of total 
expected utility from the object set: 
 
          U = [Ur, UX] = [Σr (cj) p{r (cj)}, - K Σj p {r (cj)} log2 p {r (cj)}], j = 1, 2 … 2K                (9) 
 
 Now, having established the essential premise of formulating an extrinsic utility 
measure, we can proceed to let go of the assumption that an individual is calibrated with 
perfect certainty about the intrinsic utility resulting from the given choice set so that we 
now look at the full Vroom model rather than the reduced version. If we remove the 
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restraining condition that p (Ur (C) > 0) = {0, 1} and instead we have the more general 
case of 0 ≤ p (Ur(C) > 0) ≤ 1, then we introduce another probabilistic dimension to our 
choice set whereby the individual is no longer certain about the nature of the impact the 
outcomes emanating from a specific choice will have on his intrinsic utility.  This can be 
intuitively interpreted in terms of the likely opportunity cost of making a choice from 
within a given choice set to the exclusion of all other possible choice sets. For the 
particular choice set C, if the likely opportunity cost is less than the potential reward 
obtainable, then Ur (c) > 0, if opportunity cost is equal to the potential reward obtainable, 
then Ur(C)  = 0, else if the opportunity cost is greater than the potential reward obtainable 
then Ur (C) < 0.  
 Writing Ur(C) = Σj r (cj) p{r (cj)}, j = 1, 2 … N, the total expected utility vector now 
becomes: 
 
[Ur(C), UX] = [Σj r (cj) p{r (cj)}, - K Σ p {r (cj)| Ur(C) > 0} log2 p {r (cj)| Ur(C) > 0}], j = 1, 2 … N             (10) 
 
Here p {r (cj)| Ur(C) > 0} may be estimated by the standard Bayes criterion as under: 
 
p {r (cj)| Ur(c) >0} = [p {(Ur(C) ≥0|r (cj)} p {(r (cj)}][Σj p {(Ur(C) >0|r (cj)} p {(r (cj)}]-1          (11) 
 
 
A practical application in the realms of Behavioral Finance - Evaluating an 
investor’s extrinsic utility from capital-guaranteed, structured financial products 
 
 Let a structured financial product be made up of a basket of n different assets such that 
the investor has the right to claim the return on the best-performing asset out of that 
basket after a stipulated holding period. Then, if one of the n assets in the basket is the 
risk-free asset then the investor gets assured of a minimum return equal to the risk-free 
rate i on his invested capital at the termination of the stipulated holding period.  This 
effectively means that his or her investment becomes endogenously capital-guaranteed 
as the terminal wealth, even at its worst, cannot be lower in value to the initial wealth 
plus the return earned on the risk-free asset minus a finite cost of portfolio insurance.  
 
 Therefore, with respect to each risky asset, we can have a binary response from the 
investor in terms of his or her funds-allocation decision whereby the investor either takes 
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funds out of an asset or puts funds into an asset. Since the overall portfolio has to be 
self-financing in order to pertain to a Black-Scholes kind of pricing model, funds added 
to one asset will also mean same amount of funds removed from one or more of the 
other assets in that basket. If the basket consists of a single risky asset s (and of course 
cash as the risk-free asset) then, if ηs is the amount of re-allocation effected each time 
with respect to the risky asset s, the two alternative, mutually exclusive choices open to 
the investor with respect to the risky asset s are as follows:  
 
(1) C (ηs ≥ 0) (funds left in asset s), with associated outcome r (ηs ≥ 0); and  
 
(2) C (ηs < 0) (funds removed from asset s), with associated outcome r (ηs < 0) 
 
 Therefore what the different assets are giving to the investor apart from their intrinsic 
utility in the form of higher expected terminal reward is some extrinsic utility in the form 
of available re-allocation options. Then the expected present value of the final return is 
given as follows: 
 
                           E (r) = Max [w, Max j {e-it E (rj) t}], j = 1, 2 … 2n-1                                            (12) 
 
In the above equation i is the rate of return on the risk-free asset and t is the length of 
the investment horizon in continuous time and w is the initial wealth invested i.e. ignoring 
insurance cost, if the risk-free asset outperforms all other assets E (r) = weit/eit = w.  
 
 Now what is the probability of each of the (n – 1) risky assets performing worse than the 
risk-free asset? Even if we assume that there are some cross-correlations present 
among the (n – 1) risky assets, given the statistical nature of the risk-return trade-off the 
joint probability of these assets performing worse than the risk-free asset will be very low 
over moderately long investment horizons.  And this probability will keep going down 
with every additional risky asset added to the basket. Thus each additional asset will 
empower the investor with additional choices with regards to re-allocating his or her 
funds among the different assets according to their observed performances.  
 Intuitively we can make out that the extrinsic utility to the investor is indeed maximized 
when there is an equal positive probability of actualizing each outcome rj resulting from 
ηj given that the intrinsic utility Ur(C) is greater than zero. By a purely economic rationale, 
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each additional asset introduced into the basket will be so introduced if and only if it 
significantly raises the expected monetary value of the potential terminal reward. As 
already demonstrated, the extrinsic utility maximizing criterion will be given as under: 
 
                                     p (rj | Ur(C) > 0)* = 2-(n-1) for j = 1, 2 …2n-1                                                  (13) 
 
 The composite utility vector from the multi-asset structured product will be as follows: 
 
 [Ur(C), UX] = [E ( r ), - (n – 1)Σ p {rj | Ur(C) > 0} log2 p {rj | Ur(C) > 0}], j = 1, 2 … 2n-1        (14) 
 
Choice set with a structured product having two risky assets (and cash): 
 
0 0 
1 0 
0 1 
1 1 
 
 That is, the investor can remove all funds from the two risky assets and convert it to 
cash (the risk-free asset), or the investor can take funds out of asset 2 and put it in asset 
1, or the investor can take funds out of asset 1 and put it in asset 2, or the investor can 
convert some cash into funds and put it in both the risky assets. Thus there are 4 
alternative choices for the investor when it comes to re-balancing his portfolio. 
 
Choice set with a structured product having three risky assets (and cash): 
 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 1 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 0 
1 0 1 
1 1 0 
1 1 1 
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 That is, the investor can remove all funds from the three risky assets and convert it into 
cash (the risk-free asset), or the investor can take funds out of asset 1 and asset 2 and 
put it in asset 3, or the investor can take funds out from asset 1 and asset 3 and put it in 
asset 2, or the investor can take funds out from asset 2 and asset 3 and put it in asset 1, 
or the investor can take funds out from asset 1 and put it in asset 2 and asset 3, or the 
investor can take funds out of asset 2 and put it in asset 1 and asset 3, or the investor 
can take funds out of asset 3 and put it in asset 1 and asset 2, or the investor can 
convert some cash into funds and put it in all three of the assets. Thus there are 8 
alternative choices for the investor when it comes to re-balancing his portfolio. 
 Of course, according to the Black-Scholes hedging principle, the re-balancing needs to 
be done each time by setting the optimal proportion of funds to be invested in each asset 
equal to the partial derivatives of the option valuation formula w.r.t. each of these assets. 
However, the total number of alternative choices available to the investor increases with 
every new risky asset that is added to the basket thereby contributing to the extrinsic 
utility in terms of the expected information content of the total portfolio. 
 
Coding of product information about multi-asset, structured financial portfolios 
 
 Extending the entropy measure of extrinsic utility, we may conceptualize the interaction 
between the buyer and the vendor as a two-way communication flow whereby the 
vendor informs the buyer about the expected utility derivable from the product on offer 
and the buyer informs the seller about his or her individual expected utility criteria. An 
economic transaction goes through if the two sets of information are compatible. Of 
course, the greater expected information content of the vendor’s communication, the 
higher is the extrinsic utility of the buyer. Intuitively, the expected information content of 
the vendor’s communication will increase with increase in the variety of the product on 
offer, as that will increase the likelihood of matching the buyer’s expected utility criteria.  
 
 The product information from vendor to potential buyer may be transferred through 
some medium e.g. the vendor’s website on the Internet, a targeted e-mail or a telephonic 
promotion scheme.  But such transmission of information is subject to noise and 
distractions brought about by environmental as well as psycho-cognitive factors.  While a 
distraction is prima facie predictable, (e.g. the pop-up windows that keep on opening 
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when some commercial websites are accessed), noise involves unpredictable 
perturbations (e.g. conflicting product information received from any competing sources).  
 
 Transmission of information calls for some kind of coding. Coding may be defined as a 
mapping of words from a source alphabet A to a code alphabet B. A discrete, finite 
memory-less channel with finite inputs and output alphabets is defined by a set of 
transition probabilities pi (j), i = 1, 2 … a and j = 1,2 … b with Σj pi (j) = 1 and pi (j) ≥ 0. 
Here pi (j) is the probability that for an input letter i output letter j will be received.  
 
 A code word of length n is defined as a sequence of n input letters which are actually n 
integers chosen from 1,2 … a. A block code of length n having M words is a mapping of 
the message integers from 1 to M into a set of code words each having a fixed length n.  
Thus for a structured product with N component assets, a block code of length n having 
N words would be used to map message integers from 1 to N, corresponding to each of 
the N assets, into a set of a fixed-length code words. Then there would be a total 
number of C = 2N possible combinations such that log2 C = N binary-state devises (flip-
flops) would be needed.   
 
 A decoding system for a block code is the inverse mapping of all output words of 
length n into the original message integers from 1 to M. Assuming all message integers 
are used with same probability 1/M, the probability of error Pe for a code and decoding 
system ensemble is defined as the probability of an integer being transmitted and 
received as a word which is mapped into another integer i.e. Pe is the probability of 
wrongly decoding a message.  
 
 Therefore, in terms of our structured product set up, Pe might be construed as the 
probability of misclassifying the best performing asset. Say within a structured product 
consisting of three risky assets  - a blue-chip equity portfolio, a market-neutral hedge 
fund and a commodity future (and cash as the risk-free asset), while the original 
transmitted information indicates the hedge fund to be the best performer, due to 
erroneous decoding of the encoded message, the equity portfolio is interpreted as the 
best performer. Such erroneous decoding could result in investment funds being 
allocated to the wrong asset at the wrong time.  
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 The relevance of Shannon-Fano coding to product information transmission 
 
 By the well-known Kraft’s inequality we have K = Σn 2 –li ≤ 1, where li stands for some 
definite code word lengths with a radix of 2 for binary encoding. For block codes, li = l for 
i = 1, 2 … n. As per Shannon’s coding theorem, it is possible to encode all sequences 
of n message integers into sequences of binary digits in such a way that the average 
number of binary digits per message symbol is approximately equally to the entropy of 
the source, the approximation increasing in accuracy with increase in n. For efficient 
binary codes, K = 1 i.e. log2 K = 0 as it corresponds to the maximal entropy condition. 
Therefore the inequality occurs if and only if pi ≠ 2 –li. Though the Shannon-Fano coding 
scheme is not strictly the most efficient, it has the advantage of directly deriving the code 
word length li from the corresponding probability pi. With source symbols s1, s2 … sn and 
their corresponding probabilities p1, p2 … pn, where for each pi there is an integer li, then 
given that we have bounds that span an unit length, we have the following relationship: 
 
                                           log2 (pi-1) ≤ li < log2 (pi-1) + 1                                            (15) 
 
Removing the logs, taking reciprocals and summing each term we therefore get, 
 
Σn pi ≥ Σn 2li ≥ pi/2, that is, 
 
                                                         1 ≥ Σn 2li ≥ ½                                                         (16) 
 
 Inequality (16) gets us back to the Kraft’s inequality. This shows that there is an 
instantaneously decodable code having the Shannon-Fano lengths li. By multiplying 
inequality (15) by pi and summing we get: 
 
Σn (pi log2 pi-1) ≤ Σn pili < Σn (pi log2 pi-1) + 1, that is, 
 
                                                 H2 (S) ≤ L ≤ H2 (S) + 1                                                  (17) 
 
 That is, in terms of the average Shannon-Fano code length L, we have conditional 
entropy as an effective lower bound while it is also the non-integral component of the 
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upper bound of L. This underlines the relevance of a Shannon-Fano form of coding to 
our structured product formulation as this implies that the average code word length 
used in this form of product information coding would be bounded by a measure of 
extrinsic utility to the potential investor of the structured financial product itself, which is 
definitely an intuitively appealing prospect. 
 
Conceptualizing product information transmission as a Markov process 
 
 The Black-Scholes option-pricing model is based on the underlying assumption that 
asset prices evolve according to the geometric diffusion process of a Brownian motion. 
The Brownian motion model has the following fundamental assumptions: 
 
(1). W0=0 
(2). Wt-Ws is a random variable that is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance t-s 
(3). Wt-Ws is independent of Wv-Wu if (s, t) and (u, v) are non-overlapping time intervals  
 
 Property (3) implies that the Brownian motion is a Markovian process with no long-term 
memory. The switching behavior of asset prices from “high” (Bull state) to “low” (Bear 
state) and vice versa according to Markovian transition rule constitutes a well-
researched topic in stochastic finance. It has in fact been proved that a steady-state 
equilibrium exists when the state probabilities are equalized for a stationary transition-
probability matrix (Bhattacharya, 2001). This steady-state equilibrium corresponds to the 
condition of strong efficiency in the financial markets whereby no historical market 
information can result in arbitrage opportunities over any significant length of time.  
 
 By logical extension, considering a structured portfolio with n assets, the best performer 
may be hypothesized to be traceable by a first-order Markov process, whereby the best 
performing asset at time t+1 is dependent on the best performing asset at time t. For 
example, with n = 3, we have the following state-transition matrix: 
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 Asset 1 Asset 2  Asset 3 
Asset 1  P (1 | 1) P (2 | 1) P (3 | 1) 
Asset 2 P (2 | 1) P (2 | 2) P (3 | 2) 
Asset 3 P (3 | 1) P (3 | 2) P (3 | 3) 
 
 In information theory also, a similar Markov structure is used to improve the encoding of 
a source alphabet. For each state in the Markov system, an appropriate code can be 
obtained from the corresponding transition probabilities of leaving that state. The 
efficiency gain will depend on how variable the probabilities are for each state. However, 
as the order of the Markov process is increased, the gain will tend to be less and less 
while the number of attainable states approach infinity. 
 
 The strength of the Markov formulation lies in its capacity of handling correlation 
between successive states. If S1, S2 … Sm are the first m states of a stochastic variable, 
what is the probability that the next state will be Si?  This is written as the conditional 
probability p (Si | S1, S2 … Sm). Then, the Shannon measure of information from a state 
Si is given as usual as follows: 
 
                                    I (Si | S1, S2 … Sm) = log2 {p (Si | S1, S2 … Sm)}-1                                (17) 
 
The entropy of a Markov process is then derived as follows: 
 
                                    H (S) = Σ p (S1, S2 … Sm, Si) I (Si | S1, S2 … Sm)                      (18) 
                                                Sm+1 
 
Then the extrinsic utility to an investor from a structured financial product expressed in 
terms of the entropy of a Markov process governing the state-transition of the best 
performing asset over N component risky assets (and cash as the one risk-free asset) 
within the structured portfolio would be given as follows: 
 
                     Ux = H (Portfolio) = Σ p (S1, S2 … Sm, Si) I (Si | S1, S2 … Sm)                 (19) 
                                                     SN+1 
 
  However, to find the entropy of a Markov source alphabet one needs to explicitly derive 
the stationary probabilities of being in each state of the Markov process. But these state 
probabilities may be hard to derive explicitly especially if there are a large number of 
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allowable states (e.g. corresponding to a large number of elementary risky assets within 
a structured financial product). Using Gibbs inequality, it can be show that the following 
limit can be imposed for bounding the entropy of the Markov process: 
 
       Σj p (Sj) H (Portfolio | Sj) ≤ H (S*), where H (S*) is termed the adjoint system   (20) 
 
 The entropy of the original message symbols given by the zero memory source adjoint 
system with p (Si) = pi bound the entropy of the Markov process. The equality holds if 
and only if p (Sj, Si) = pjpi that is, in terms of the structured portfolio set up, the equality 
holds if and only if the joint probability of the best performer being the pair of assets i and 
j is equal to the product of their individual probabilities (Hamming, 1986).  Thus a clear 
analogical parallel may be drawn between Markovian structure of the coding process 
and performances of financial assets contained within a structured investment portfolio. 
 
Conclusion and scope for future research 
 
 In this paper we have basically outlined a novel methodological approach whereby 
expected information measure is used as a measure of utility derivable from a basket of 
commodities. We have illustrated the concepts with an applied finance perspective 
whereby we have used this methodological approach to derive a measure of investor 
utility from a structured financial portfolio consisting of many elementary risky assets 
combined with cash as the risk-free asset thereby giving the product a quasi - capital 
guarantee status. We have also borrowed concepts from mathematical information 
theory and coding to draw analogical parallels with the utility structures evolving out of 
multi-asset, structured financial products. In particular, principles of Shannon-Fano 
coding have been applied to the coding of product information for transmission from 
vendor (fund manager) to the potential buyer (investor). Finally we have dwelled upon 
the very similar Markovian structure of coding process and that of asset performances. 
 
 This paper in many ways is a curtain raiser on the different ways in which tools and 
concepts from mathematical information theory can be applied in utility analysis in 
general and to analyzing investor utility preferences in particular. It seeks to extend the 
normal peripheries of utility theory to a new domain – that of information theoretic utility. 
Thus a cardinal measure of utility is proposed in the form of the Shannon-Boltzmann 
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entropy measure. Being a new methodological approach, the scope of future research is 
boundless especially in exploring the analogical Markovian properties of asset 
performances and message transmission and devising an efficient coding scheme to 
represent the two-way transfer of utility information from vendor to buyer and vice versa. 
The mathematical kinship between neoclassical utility theory and classical 
thermodynamics is also worth exploring, may be aimed at establishing some higher-
dimensional, theoretical connectivity between the isotherms and the indifference curves!  
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